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Abstract. We define On-Average KL-Privacy and present its properties
and connections to differential privacy, generalization and information-
theoretic quantities including max-information and mutual information.
The new definition significantly weakens differential privacy, while preserv-
ing its minimalistic design features such as composition over small group
and multiple queries as well as closeness to post-processing. Moreover,
we show that On-Average KL-Privacy is equivalent to generalization for
a large class of commonly-used tools in statistics and machine learning
that samples from Gibbs distributions—a class of distributions that arises
naturally from the maximum entropy principle. In addition, a byproduct
of our analysis yields a lower bound for generalization error in terms of
mutual information which reveals an interesting interplay with known
upper bounds that use the same quantity.
Keywords: differential privacy, generalization, stability, information
theory, maximum entropy, statistical learning theory,
1 Introduction
Increasing privacy concerns have become a major obstacle for collecting,
analyzing and sharing data, as well as communicating results of a data
analysis in sensitive domains. For example, the second Netflix Prize compe-
tition was canceled in response to a lawsuit and Federal Trade Commission
privacy concerns, and the National Institute of Health decided in August
2008 to remove aggregate Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS)
data from the public web site, after learning about a potential privacy risk.
These concerns are well-grounded in the context of the Big-Data era as
stories about privacy breaches from improperly-handled data set appear
very regularly (e.g., medical records [3], Netflix [27], NYC Taxi [36]). These
incidences highlight the need for formal methods that provably protects
the privacy of individual-level data points while allowing similar database
level of utility comparing to the non-private counterpart.
There is a long history of attempts to address these problems and the
risk-utility tradeoff in statistical agencies [9, 19, 8] but most of the methods
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developed do not provide clear and quantifiable privacy guarantees. Dif-
ferential privacy [14, 10] succeeds in the first task. While it allows a clear
quantification of the privacy loss, it provides a worst-case guarantee and in
practice it often requires adding noise with a very large magnitude (if finite
at all), hence resulting in unsatisfactory utility, cf., [32, 37, 16].
A growing literature focuses on weakening the notion of differential privacy
to make it applicable and for a more favorable privacy-utility trade-off.
Popular attempts include (, δ)-approximate differential privacy [13], per-
sonalized differential privacy [15, 22], random differential privacy [17] and
so on. They each have pros and cons and are useful in their specific con-
texts. There is a related literature addressing the folklore observation that
“differential privacy implies generalization” [12, 18, 30, 11, 5, 35].
The implication of generalization is a minimal property that we feel any
notion of privacy should have. This brings us to the natural question:
– Is there a weak notion of privacy that is equivalent to generalization?
In this paper, we provide a partial answer to this question. Specifically,
we define On-Average Kullback-Leibler(KL)-Privacy and show that it
characterizes On-Average Generalization1 for algorithms that draw sample
from an important class of maximum entropy/Gibbs distributions, i.e.,
distributions with probability/density proportional to
exp(−L(Output,Data))pi(Output)
for a loss function L and (possibly improper) prior distribution pi.
We argue that this is a fundamental class of algorithms that covers a big
portion of tools in modern data analysis including Bayesian inference,
empirical risk minimization in statistical learning as well as the private
releases of database queries through Laplace and Gaussian noise adding.
From here onwards, we will refer this class of distributions “MaxEnt
distributions” and the algorithm that output a sample from a MaxEnt
distribution “posterior sampling”.
Related work: This work is closely related to the various notions of
algorithmic stability in learning theory [21, 7, 26, 29]. In fact, we can treat
differential privacy as a very strong notion of stability. Thus On-average
KL-privacy may well be called On-average KL-stability. Stability implies
generalization in many different settings but they are often only sufficient
conditions. Exceptions include [26, 29] who show that notions of stability
1 We will formally define these quantities.
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are also necessary for the consistency of empirical risk minimization
and distribution-free learnability of any algorithms. Our specific stability
definition, its equivalence to generalization and its properties as a privacy
measure has not been studied before. KL-Privacy first appears in [4] and
is shown to imply generalization in [5]. On-Average KL-privacy further
weakens KL-privacy. A high-level connection can be made to leave-one-out
cross validation which is often used as a (slightly biased) empirical measure
of generalization, e.g., see [25].
2 Symbols and Notation
We will use the standard statistical learning terminology where z ∈ Z
is a data point, h ∈ H is a hypothesis and ` : Z × H → R is the loss
function. One can think of the negative loss function as a measure of
utility of h on data point z. Lastly, A is a possibly randomized algorithm
that maps a data set Z ∈ Zn to some hypothesis h ∈ H. For example,
if A is the empirical risk minimization (ERM), then A chooses h∗ =
argminh∈H
∑n
i=1 `(zi, h).
Just to point out that many data analysis tasks can be casted in this
form, e.g., in linear regression, zi = (xi, yi) ∈ Rd × R, h is the coefficient
vector and ` is just ‖yi − xTi h‖2; in k-means clustering, z ∈ Rd is just
the feature vector, h = {h1, ..., hk} is the collection of k-cluster centers
and `(z, h) = minj ‖z − hj‖2. Simple calculations of statistical quantities
can often be represented in this form too, e.g., calculating the mean is
equivalent to linear regression with identity design, and calculating the
median is the same as ERM with loss function |z − h|.
We also consider cases when the loss function is defined over the whole
data set Z ∈ Z, in this case the loss function is also evaluated on the whole
data set by the structured loss L : h × Z → R. We do not require Z to
be drawn from some product distribution, but rather any distribution D.
Generally speaking, Z could be a string of text, a news article, a sequence
of transactions of a credit card user, or rather just the entire data set
of n iid samples. We will revisit this generalization with more concrete
examples later. However we would like to point out that this is equivalent
to the above case when we only have one (much more complicated) data
point and the algorithm A is applied to only one sample.
3 Main Results
We first describe differential privacy and then it will become very intu-
itive where KL-privacy and On-Average KL-privacy come from. Roughly
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speaking, differential privacy requires that for any datasets Z and Z ′ that
differs by only one data point, the algorithm A(Z) and A(Z ′) samples
output h from two distributions that are very similar to each other. Define
“Hamming distance”
d(Z,Z ′) := #{i = 1, ..., n : zi 6= z′i} . (1)
Definition 1 (-Differential Privacy [10]) We call an algorithm A -
differentially private (or in short -DP), if
P(A(Z) ∈ H) ≤ exp()P(A(Z ′) ∈ H)
for ∀ Z, Z ′ obeying d(Z,Z ′) = 1 and any measurable subset H ⊆ H.
More transparently, assuming the range of A is the whole space H, and
also assume A(Z) defines a density on H with respect to a base measure
on H2, then -Differential Privacy requires
sup
Z,Z′:d(Z,Z′)≤1
sup
h∈H
log
pA(Z)(h)
pA(Z′)(h)
≤ .
Replacing the second supremum with an expectation over h ∼ A(Z) we get
the maximum KL-divergence over the output from two adjacent datasets.
This is KL-Privacy as defined in Barber and Duchi [4], and by replacing
both supremums with expectations we get what we call On-Average KL-
Privacy. For Z ∈ Zn and z ∈ Z, denote [Z−1, z] ∈ Zn the data set
obtained from replacing the first entry of Z by z. Also recall that the
KL-divergence between two distributions F and G is DKL(F‖G) = EF dFdG .
Definition 2 (On-Average KL-Privacy) We say A obeys -On-Average
KL-privacy for some distribution D if
EZ∼Dn,z∼DDKL(A(Z)‖A([Z−1, z])) ≤ .
Note that by the property of KL-divergence, the On-Average KL-Privacy
is always nonnegative and is 0 if and only if the two distributions are the
same almost everywhere. In the above case, it happens when z = z′.
Unlike differential privacy that provides a uniform privacy guarantee for
any users in Z, on-average KL-Privacy is a distribution-specific quantity
2 These assumptions are only for presentation simplicity. The notion of On-Average
KL-privacy can naturally handle mixture of densities and point masses.
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that measures the amount of average privacy loss of an average data point
z ∼ D suffer from running data analysis A on an data set Z drawn iid
from the same distribution D.
We argue that this kind of average privacy protection is practically useful
because it is able to adapt to benign distributions and is much less sensitive
to outliers. After all, when differential privacy fails to provide a meaningful
 due to peculiar data sets that exist in Zn but rarely appear in practice,
we would still be interested to gauge how a randomized algorithm protects
a typical user’s privacy.
Now we define what we mean by generalization. Let the empirical risk
Rˆ(h, Z) = 1n
∑n
i=1 `(h, zi) and the actual risk be R(h) = Ez∼D`(h, z).
Definition 3 (On-Average Generalization) We say an algorithm A
has on-average generalization error  if
∣∣∣ER(A(Z))− ERˆ(A(Z), Z)∣∣∣ ≤ .
This is slightly weaker than the standard notion of generalization in ma-
chine learning which requires E|R(A(Z))− Rˆ(A(Z), Z)| ≤ . Nevertheless,
on-average generalization is sufficient for the purpose of proving consis-
tency for methods that approximately minimizes the empirical risk.
3.1 The equivalence to generalization
It turns out that when A assumes a special form, that is, sampling from
a Gibbs distribution, we can completely characterize generalization of A
using On-Average KL-Privacy. This class of algorithms include the most
general mechanism for differential privacy — exponential mechanism [23],
which casts many other noise adding procedures as special cases. We will
discuss a more compelling reason why restricting our attention to this
class is not limiting in Section 3.3.
Theorem 4 (On-Average KL-Privacy ⇔ Generalization) Let the
loss function `(z, h) = − log p(z|h) for some model p parameterized by h,
and let
A(Z) : h ∼ p(h|Z) ∝ exp
(
−
n∑
i=1
`(z, h)− r(h)
)
.
If in additional A(Z) obeys that for every Z, the distribution p(h|Z) is
well-defined (in that the normalization constant is finite), then A satisfy
-On-Average KL-Privacy if and only if A has on-average generalization
error .
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The proof, given in the Appendix, uses a ghost sample trick and the fact
that the expected normalization constants of the sampling distribution
over Z and Z ′ are the same.
Remark 1 (Structural Loss). Take n = 1, and loss function be L. Then for
an algorithmA that samples with probability proportional to exp(−L(h, Z)−
r(h)): -On-Average KL-Privacy is equivalent to -generalization of the
structural loss.
Remark 2 (Dispersion parameter γ). The case whenA ∝ exp(−γ[L(h, Z)−
r(h)]) for a constant γ can be handled by redefining L′ = γL. In that case,
γ-On-Average KL-Privacy with respect to L′ implies γ/γ generalization
with respect to L. For this reason, larger γ may not imply strictly better
generalization.
Remark 3 (Comparing to differential Privacy). Note that here we do not
require ` to be uniformly bounded, but if we do, i.e. supz∈Z,h∈H |`(z, h)| ≤
B, then the same algorithm A above obeys 4Bγ-Differential Privacy [23,
34] and it implies O(Bγ)-generalization. This, however, could be much
larger than the actual generalization error (see our examples in Section 6).
3.2 Preservation of other properties of DP
We now show that despite being much weaker than DP, On-Average KL-
privacy does inherent some of the major properties of differential privacy
(under mild additional assumptions in some cases).
Lemma 5 (Closeness to Post-processing) Let f be any (possibly ran-
domized) measurable function from H to another domain H′, then for any
Z,Z ′
DKL(f(A(Z))‖f(A(Z ′))) ≤ DKL(A(Z)‖A(Z ′)).
Proof. This directly follows from the data processing inequality for the
Re´nyi divergence in Van Erven and Harremoe¨s [33, Theorem 1].
Lemma 6 (Small group privacy) Let k ≤ n. Assume A is posterior
sampling as in Theorem 4. Then for any k = 1, ..., n, we have
E[Z,z1:k]∼Dn+kDKL (A(Z)‖A([Z−1:k, z1:k])) = kE[Z,z]∼Dn+1DKL (A(Z)‖A([Z−1, z])) .
Lemma 7 (Adaptive Composition Theorem) Let A be 1-(On-Average)
KL-Privacy and B(·, h) be 2-(On-Average) KL-Privacy for every h ∈ ΩA
where the support of random function A is ΩA. Then (A,B) jointly is
(1 + 2)-(On-Average) KL-Privacy.
We prove Lemma 6 and 7 in the appendix.
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3.3 Posterior Sampling as Max-Entropy solutions
In this section, we give a few theoretical justifications why restricting to
posterior sampling is not limiting the applicability of Theorem 4 much.
First of all, Laplace, Gaussian and Exponential Mechanism in the Differ-
ential Privacy literature are special cases of this class. Secondly, among
all distributions to sample from, the Gibbs distribution is the variational
solution that simultaneously maximizes the conditional entropy and utility.
To be more precise on the claim, we first define conditional entropy.
Definition 8 (Conditional Entropy) Conditional entropy
H(A(Z)|Z) = −EZEh∼A(Z) log p(h|Z)
where A(Z) ∼ p(h|Z).
Theorem 9 Let Z ∼ Dn for any distribution D. A variational solution
to the following convex optimization problem
min
A
− 1
γ
EZ∼DnH(A(Z)|Z) + EZ∼DnEh∼A(Z)
n∑
i=1
`i(h, zi) (2)
is A that outputs h with distribution p(h|Z) ∝ exp (−γ∑ni=1 `i(h, zi)) .
Proof. This is an instance of Theorem 3 in Mir [24] (first appeared in
Tishby et al. [31]) by taking the distortion function to be the empirical
risk. Note that this is a simple convex optimization over the functions and
the proof involves substituting the solution into the optimality condition
with a specific Lagrange multiplier chosen to appropriately adjust the
normalization constant. uunionsq
The above theorem is distribution-free, and in fact works for every instance
of Z separately. Condition on each Z, the variational optimization finds the
distribution with maximum information entropy among all distributions
that satisfies a set of utility constraints. This corresponds to the well-
known principle of maximum entropy (MaxEnt) [20]. Many philosophical
justifications of this principle has been proposed, but we would like to
focus on the statistical perspective and treat it as a form of regularization
that penalizes the complexity of the chosen distribution (akin to Akaike
Information Criterion [1]), hence avoiding overfitting to the data. For more
information, we refer the readers to references on MaxEnt’s connections
to thermal dynamics [20], to Bayesian inference and convex duality [2] as
well as its modern use in modeling natural languages [6].
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Note that the above characterization also allows for any form of prior pi(h)
to be assumed. Denote prior entropy H˜(h) = −Eh∼pi(h) log(pi(h)), and
define information gain I˜(h;Z) = H˜(h)−H(h|Z). The variational solution
of p(h|Z) that minimizes I˜(h;Z) + γEZEh|ZL(Z, h) is proportional to
exp(−L(Z, h))pi(h). This provides an alternative way of seeing the class of
algorithms A that we consider. I˜(h;Z) can be thought of as a information-
theoretic quantification of privacy loss, as described in [38, 24]. As a result,
we can think of the class of A that samples from MaxEnt distributions
as the most private algorithm among all algorithms that achieves a given
utility constraint.
4 Max-Information and Mutual Information
Recently, Dwork et al. [11] defined approximate max-information and used
it as a tool to prove generalization (with high probability). Russo and
Zou [28] showed that the weaker mutual information implies on-average
generalization under a distribution assumption of the entire space of
{L(h, Z)|h ∈ H} induced by distribution of Z. In this section, we compare
On-Average KL-Privacy with these two notions. Note that we will use Z
and Z ′ to denote two completely different datasets rather than adjacent
ones as we had in differential privacy.
Definition 10 (Max-Information, Definition 11 in [11]) We say A
has an β-approximate max-information of k if for every distribution D,
Iβ∞(Z;A(Z)) = max
(H,Z)⊂H×Zn:P(h∈H,Z∈Z˜)>β
log
P(h ∈ H,Z ∈ Z˜)− β
P(h ∈ H)p(Z ∈ Z˜) ≤ k.
This is alternatively denoted by Iβ∞(A, n) ≤ k. We say A has a pure
max-information of k if β = 0.
It is shown that differential privacy and short description length imply
bounds on max-information [11], hence generalization. Here we show
that the pure max-information implies a very strong On-Average-KL-
Privacy for any distribution D when we take A to be a posterior sampling
mechanism.
Lemma 11 (Relationship to max-information) If A is a posterior
sampling mechanism as described in Theorem 4, then I∞(A, n) ≤ k im-
plies that A obeys k/n-On-Average-KL-Privacy for any data generating
distribution D.
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An immediate corollary of the above connection is that we can now
significantly simplify the proof for “max-information ⇒ generalization”
for posterior sampling algorithms.
Corollary 12 Let A be a posterior sampling algorithm. I∞(A, n) ≤ k
implies that A generalizes with rate k/n.
We now compare to mutual information and draw connections to [28].
Definition 13 (Mutual Information) The mutual information
I(A(Z);Z) = EZEh∼A(Z) log
p(h, Z)
p(h)p(Z)
where A(Z) ∼ p(h|Z), p(Z) = Dn and p(h) = ∫ p(h|Z)p(Z)dZ.
Lemma 14 (Relationship to Mutual Information) For any random-
ized algorithm A, let A(Z) be an RV, and Z,Z ′ be two datasets of size n.
We have
I(A(Z);Z) = DKL(A(Z)‖A(Z′)) + EZEh∼A(Z)
[
EZ′ log p(A(Z′))− logEZ′p(A(Z′))
]
,
which by Jensen’s inequality implies I(A(Z), Z) ≤ DKL(A(Z)‖A(Z ′)).
A natural observation is that for MaxEnt A defined with L, mutual
information lower bounds its generalization error. On the other hand,
Proposition 1 in Russo and Zou [28] states that under the assumption that
L(h, Z) is σ2-subgaussian for every h, then the on-average generalization
error is always smaller than σ
√
2I(A(Z);L(·, Z)). Similar results hold for
sub-exponential L(h, Z) [28, Proposition 3].
Note that in their bounds, I(A(Z);L(·, Z)) is the mutual information
between the choice of hypothesis h and the loss function for which we
are defining generalization on. By data processing inequality, we have
I(A(Z);L(·, Z)) ≤ I(A(Z);Z). Further, when A is posterior distribution,
it only depends on Z through L(·, Z), namely L(·, Z) is a sufficient statistic
for A. As a result A ⊥ Z|L(·, Z). Therefore, we know I(A(Z);L(·, Z)) =
I(A(Z);Z). Combine this observation with Lemma 14 and Theorem 4,
we get the following characterization of generalization through mutual
information.
Corollary 15 (Mutual information and generalization) Let A be
an algorithm that samples ∝ exp (−γL(h, Z)), and L(h, Z) − R(h) is
σ2-subgaussian for any h ∈ H, then
1
γ
I(A(Z);Z) ≤ ∣∣EZEh∼A(Z)[L(h, Z)−R(h)]∣∣ ≤ σ√2I(A(Z);Z).
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Privacy definition Z z Distance (pseudo)metric
Pure DP supZ∈Zn supz∈Z D∞(P‖Q)
Approx-DP supZ∈Zn supz∈Z D
δ
∞(P‖Q)
Personal-DP supZ∈Zn for each z D∞(P‖Q) or Dδ∞(P‖Q)
KL-Privacy supZ∈Zn supz∈Z DKL(P‖Q)
TV-Privacy supZ∈Zn supz∈Z ‖P −Q‖TV
Rand-Privacy 1− δ1 any Dn 1− δ1 any D Dδ2∞(P‖Q)
On-Avg KL-Privacy EZ∼Dn for each D EZ∼D for each D DKL(P‖Q)
Table 1. Summary of different privacy definitions.
Pure-DP
Approx-DP
KL-Privacy
TV-Privacy
On-Avg KL-Privacy
Personal-DP
Random-DP 1-­‐𝛿	  Generalization
|E Generalization|	  
E|Generalization|	  
MarkovIf Bounded
Pinsker
For insensitive queries
For MaxEnt Sampling
If small
varianceJensen
Fig. 1. Relationship of different privacy definitions and generalization.
If L(h, Z)−R(h) is σ2-subexponential with parameter (σ, b) instead, then
we have a weaker upper bound bI(A(Z);Z) + σ2/(2b).
The corollary implies that for each γ we have an intriguing bound that
says I(A;Z) ≤ 2γ2σ2 for any distribution of Z, H and L such that L(·, Z)
is σ2-subgaussian. One interesting case is when γ = 1/σ. This gives
σI(A(Z);Z) ≤ ∣∣EZEh∼A(Z)[L(h, Z)−R(h)]∣∣ ≤ σ√2I(A(Z);Z).
The lower bound is therefore sharp up to a multiplicative factor of√
I(A(Z);Z).
5 Connections to Other Attempts to Weaken DP
We compare and contrast the On-Average KL-Privacy with other notions
of privacy that are designed to weaken the original DP. The (certainly in-
complete) list includes (, δ)-approximate differential privacy (Approx-DP)
[13], random differential privacy (Rand-DP) [17], Personalized Differential
Privacy (Personal-DP) [15, 22] and Total-Variation-Privacy (TV-Privacy)
[4, 5]. Table 1 summarizes and compares of these definitions.
On-Average KL-Privacy and its equivalence to Generalization 11
.
10-2 10-1 100 101 102
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
102
104
Normal mean estimation
Est. Generalization
KL-Privacy
KL-Privacy/.
Excess risk
Diff. Privacy loss 0
.
10-2 10-1 100 101 102
10-4
10-2
100
102
104
Linear regression
Est. Generalization
KL-Privacy
KL-Privacy/.
Excess risk
Diff. Privacy loss 0
Fig. 2. Comparison of On-Avg KL-Privacy and Differential Privacy on two examples.
A key difference of On-Average KL-Privacy from almost all other previous
definitions of privacy, is that the probability is defined only over the
random coins of private algorithms. For this reason, even if we convert our
bound into the high probability form, the meaning of the small probability
δ would be very different from that in Approx-DP. The only exception
in the list is Rand-DP, which assumes, like we do, the n+ 1 data points
in adjacent data sets Z and Z ′ are draw iid from a distribution. Ours is
weaker than Rand-DP in that ours is a distribution-specific quantity.
Among these notions of privacy, Pure-DP and Approx-DP have been shown
to imply generalization with high probability [12, 5]; and TV-privacy was
more shown to imply generalization (in expectation) for a restricted class
of queries (loss functions) [5]. The relationship between our proposal and
these known results are clearly illustrated in Fig. 1. To the best of our
knowledge, our result is the first of its kind that crisply characterizes
generalization.
Lastly, we would like to point out that while each of these definitions
retains some properties of differential privacy, they might not possess all of
them simultaneously and satisfactorily. For example, (, δ)-approx-DP does
not have a satisfactory group privacy guarantee as δ grows exponentially
with the group size.
6 Experiments
In this section, we validate our theoretical results through numerical
simulation. Specifically, we use two simple examples to compare the  of
differential privacy,  of on-average KL-privacy, the generalization error, as
well as the utility, measured in terms of the excess population risk.
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The first example is the private release of mean, we consider Z to be
the mean of 100 samples from standard normal distribution truncated
between [−2, 2]. Hypothesis space H = R, loss function L(Z, h) = |Z − h|.
A samples with probability proportional to exp(−γ|Z−h|). Note that this
is the simple Laplace mechanism for differential privacy and the global
sensitivity is 4, as a result this algorithm is 4γ-differentially private.
The second example we consider is a simple linear regression in 1D.
We generate the data from a simple univariate linear regression model
y = xh+noise, where x and the noise are both sampled iid from a uniform
distribution defined on [−1, 1]. The true h is chosen to be 1. Moreover,
we use the standard square loss `(zi, h) = (yi − xih)2. Clearly, the data
domain Z = Y ×X = [−1, 1]× [−2, 2] and if we constrain H to be within
a bounded set [−2, 2], supx,y,β(y − xβ)2 ≤ 16 and the posterior sampling
with parameter γ obeys 64γ-DP.
Fig. 2 plots the results over an exponential grid of parameter γ. In these
two examples, we calculate on-Average KL-Privacy using known formula
of the KL-divergence of Laplace and Gaussian distributions. Then we
stochastically estimate the expectation over data. We estimate the gener-
alization error in the direct formula by evaluating on fresh samples. As we
can see, appropriately scaled On-Average KL-Privacy characterizes the
generalization error precisely as the theory predicts. On the other hand, if
we just compare the privacy losses, the average  from a random dataset
given by On-Avg KL-Privacy is smaller than that for the worst case in
DP by orders of magnitudes.
7 Conclusion
We presented On-Average KL-privacy as a new notion of privacy (or sta-
bility) on average. We showed that this new definition preserves properties
of differential privacy including closedness to post-processing, small group
privacy and adaptive composition. Moreover, we showed that On-Average
KL-privacy/stability characterizes a weak form of generalization for a large
class of sampling distributions that simultaneously maximize entropy and
utility. This equivalence and connections to certain information-theoretic
quantities allowed us to provide the first lower bound of generalization
using mutual information. Lastly, we conduct numerical simulations which
confirm our theory and demonstrate the substantially more favorable
privacy-utility trade-off.
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A Proofs of technical results
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). We prove this result using a ghost sample
trick.
Ez∼D,Z∼DnEh∼A(Z)
[
`(z, h)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(zi, h)
]
=EZ′∼Dn,Z∼DnEh∼A(Z)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(z′i, h)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(zi, h)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez′i∼D,Z∼DnEh∼A(Z)
[
`(z′i, h)− `(zi, h)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez′i∼D,Z∼DnEh∼A(Z)
`(z′i, h) +∑
j 6=i
`(zj , h) + r(h)− `(zi, h)−
∑
j 6=i
`(zj , h)− r(h)

=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez′i∼D,Z∼DnEA(Z)
[
− log pA([Z−i,z′i])(h) + log pA(Z)(h)(h) + logKi − logK
′
i
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ez′i∼D,Z∼DnEA(Z)
[
log pA(Z)(h)− log pA([Z−i,z′i])(h)
]
=Ez∼D,Z∼DnEh∼A(Z)
[
log pA(Z)(h)− log pA([Z−1,z])(h)
]
.
The Ki and K
′
i are partition functions of pA(Z)(h) and pA([Z−i,z′i])(h)
respectively. Since zi ∼ z′i, we know EKi−EK ′i = 0. The proof is complete
by noting that the On-Average KL-privacy is always non-negative and so
is the difference of the actual risk and expected empirical risk (therefore
we can take absolute value without changing the equivalence). uunionsq
Proof (Proof of Lemma 6). Let k = 2, we have
E[Z,z′1,z′2]∼Dn+2Eh∼A(Z) log
pA(Z)(h)
pA([Z−1:2,z′1,z′2])(h)
=E[Z,z′1]∼Dn+1Eh∼A(Z)
[
log
pA(Z)(h)
pA([Z−1,z′1])(h)
]
+ E[Z,z′1,z′2]∼Dn+2Eh∼A(Z)
[
log
pA([Z−1,z′1])(h)
pA([Z−1:2,z′1,z′2])(h)
]
≤+ E[Z,z′1,z′2]∼Dn+2Eh∼A(Z)
[
log
pA([Z−1,z′1])(h)
pA([Z−1:2,z′1,z′2])(h)
]
.
The technical issue is that the second term does not have the correct
distribution to take expectation over. By the property of A being a
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posterior sampling algorithm, we can rewrite the second term of the above
equation into
EZ∼Dn,z′1,z′2∼DEh∼A(Z)
[
log p(z2, h)− log p(z′2, h)− logK + logK ′
]
whereK andK ′ are normalization constants of exp(log p(z′1, h)+
∑n
i=2 log p(zi, h))
and exp(log p(z′1, h) + log p(z′2, h) +
∑n
i=3 log p(zi, h)) respectively. The ex-
pected log-partition functions are the same so we can replace them with
normalization constants of exp(
∑n
i=1 log p(zi, h)) and exp(log p(z
′
2, h) +∑
i 6=2 log p(zi, h)). By adding and subtracting the missing log-likelihood
functions on z1, z3, ..., zn, we get
EZ∼Dn,z′1,z′2∼DEh∼A(Z)
[
log
pA([Z−1,z′1])(h)
pA([Z−1:2,z′2])(h)
]
=EZ∼Dn,z′1,z′2∼DEh∼A(Z)
[
log
pA(Z)(h)
pA([Z−2,z′2])(h)
]
≤ 
This completes the proof for k = 2. Apply the same argument recursively
by different decompositions of , we get the results for k = 3, ..., n.
The second statement follows by the same argument with all “≤” changed
into “=”. uunionsq
Proof (Proof of Lemma 7).
Eh1∼A(Z)Eh2∼B(Z,h1) log
[
pB(Z,h1)(h2)
pB(Z′,h1)(h2)
pA(Z)(h1)
pA(Z′)(h1)
]
=Eh1∼A(Z)Eh2∼B(Z,h1) log
[
pB(Z,h1)(h2)
pB(Z′,h1)(h2)
]
+ Eh1∼A(Z)Eh2∼B(Z,h1) log
[
pA(Z)(h1)
pA(Z′)(h1)
]
≤ sup
h1∈ΩA
Eh2∼B(S,h1) log
[
pB(Z,h1)(h2)
pB(Z′,h1)(h2)
]
+ Eh1∼A(Z) log
[
pA(Z)(h1)
pA(Z′)(h1)
]
Take sup over Z and Z ′ we get the adaptive composition result for KL-
Privacy. Take E over Z and z such that Z ′ = [Z−1, z], we get the adaptive
composition result for On-Average KL-Privacy. uunionsq
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Proof (Proof of Lemma 11). By Lemma 12 in Dwork et al. [11], I∞(A, n) =
supZ,Z′∈Zn D∞(A(Z)||A(Z ′)).
D∞(A(Z)||A(Z ′)) = sup
h
log
pA(Z)(h)
pA(Z′)(h)
= sup
h
n∑
i=1
log
pA([Z−1:(i−1),Z′1:(i−1)])(h)
pA([Z−1:(i),Z′1:(i)])(h)
≥ Eh∼A(Z)
n∑
i=1
log
pA([Z−1:(i−1),Z′1:(i−1)])(h)
pA([Z−1:(i),Z′1:(i)])(h)
≥
n∑
i=1
Eh∼A(Z) log
pA([Z−1:(i−1),Z′1:(i−1)])(h)
pA([Z−1:(i),Z′1:(i)])(h)
=
n∑
i=1
Eh∼A(Z)(log p(zi;h)− log p(z′i;h)− logKi + logK ′i)
whereKi andK
′
i are normalization constants for distribution pA([Z−1:(i−1),Z′1:(i−1)])(h)
and pA([Z−1:(i),Z′1:(i)])(h) respectively.
Take expectation over Z and Z ′ on both sides, by symmetry, the ex-
pected normalization constants are equal no matter which size n subset
of [Z,Z ′] this posterior distribution h is defined over. Define Z(i) :=
[z1, ..., zi−1, z′i, zi+1, ..., zn]. Let K be the normalization constant of A(Z)
and K(i) be the normalization constant of A(Z(i)). We get
EZ,Z′∼DnD∞(A(Z)||A(Z ′)) ≥ EZ,Z′∼Dn
n∑
i=1
Eh∼A(Z)(log p(zi;h)− log p(z′i;h))
=EZ,Z′∼Dn
n∑
i=1
Eh∼A(Z)
 n∑
j=1
log ph(zj)−
∑
j 6=i
log ph(zj)− log ph(z′i)− logK + logK(i)

=EZ,Z′∼Dn
n∑
i=1
Eh∼A(Z)
[
log
pA(Z)(h)
pA(Z(i))(h)
]
=
n∑
i=1
EZ∼Dn,z′i∼DEh∼A(Z)
[
log
pA(Z)(h)
pA(Z(i))(h)
]
Note that
RHS = nEZ∼Dn,z∼DKL(A(Z)‖A([Z−1, z])),
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and
LHS = EZ,Z′∼DnD∞(A(Z)‖A(Z ′)) ≤ sup
Z,Z′∈Zn
D∞(A(Z)‖A(Z ′)) = I∞(A, n).
Collecting the three systems of inequalities above, we get that A is k/n-
On-Average-KL-Privacy as claimed. uunionsq
Proof (Proof of Lemma 14). Denote p(A(Z)) = p(h|Z). p(h, Z) = p(h|Z)p(Z).
The marginal distribution of h is therefore p(h) =
∫
Z p(h, Z)dZ = EZp(A(Z)).
By definition,
I(A(Z);Z) = EZEh|Z log
p(h|Z)p(Z)
p(h)p(Z)
=EZEh|Z log p(h|Z)− EZEh|Z logEZ′p(h|Z ′)
=EZEh|Z log p(h|Z)− EZ,Z′Eh|Z log p(h|Z ′)
+ EZ,Z′Eh|Z log p(h|Z ′)− EZEh|Z logEZ′p(h|Z ′)
=EZ,Z′Eh|Z log
p(h|Z)
p(h|Z ′) + EZ,Z′Eh|Z log p(h|Z
′)− EZEh|Z logEZ′p(h|Z ′)
=DKL(A(Z),A(Z ′)) + EZEh|Z
[
EZ′ log p(A(Z ′))− logEZ′p(A(Z ′))
]
≤DKL(A(Z),A(Z ′)).
The last line follows from Jensen’s inequality. uunionsq
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